



Titles of reports related to Macondo

File #	Published	Updated	Topic	Pages	Chart
1000030	Apr 20, 14		<p>Advances since Macondo: Well Integrity Management Systems & Halliburton's Technology Center</p> <p>This report comments on selected themes discussed at an industry conference that took place in Houston on April 15-16 on Well Integrity Management Systems (WIMS) and related topics. Presented by DECOM WORLD, it featured diverse speakers from operators and service companies, in addition to an exhibition area for vendors that included IBM as the Gold Sponsor. WIMS seems to have replaced SEMS, a post-Macondo initiative. The report includes observations of a tour of Halliburton's Houston Technology Center on April 16. Ideas from social science are offered to complement engineering advances.</p>	7	0
093012	Sep 30, 12		<p>The Political Science of Industrial Safety: Have the Deeper Lessons of Deepwater Horizon Been Learned?</p> <p>A visit took place to the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> by a senior, joint safety audit team on the day of the Macondo blow-out. The team focused on occupational safety and ignored issues of process safety (e.g., tests of cement integrity). See <i>The Journal of Energy & Development</i> (Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, pp. 219-226).</p> <p>http://www.scribd.com/doc/112111810/%E2%80%9CThe-Political-Science-of-Industrial-Safety-Have-the-Deeper-Lessons-of-Deepwater-Horizon-Been-Learned-%E2%80%9D-by-George-Baker</p>	6	0
100103	Oct 10, 11		<p>The Political Science of Industrial Safety</p> <p>This report seeks to abstract from the events that took place on Deepwater Horizon on April 20, 2010, in order to gain a picture of the inevitable changes ahead in law and regulation that will create a new regime in which both contractors and well owners will be jointly liability for accident prevention and accountability.</p>	6	3
100093	Jul 01, 11	Jul 2, 11	<p>BP's Lessons from BP-Macondo</p> <p>On June 30, 2011, at a workshop sponsored by the OCS Advisory Board BP's exploration manager for the Gulf of Mexico set forth the principal lessons from the accident at the Macondo well on April 20, 2010. The lessons were grouped in five categories: 1) Prevention, Drilling and Equipment Monitoring 2) Containment, 3) Relief Wells, 4) Spill Response and 5) Crisis Management. The report notes such such future-oriented goals do not address changes ahead in the contractual relationships between contractors and the oil company and among oil companies themselves.</p>	4	0
100088	May 30, 11	Jun 6, 11	<p>Credit and Blame at BP-Macondo</p> <p>This report, based on a close reading of much of the public record, complemented by industry interviews, seeks a balanced assessment of credit and blame in regard to the series of accidents at the BP-Macondo well on April 20, 2010. Blame and credit is assigned to industry and government actors for their roles before and after the blowout. The report seeks to apply lessons learned to Mexico's deepwater aspirations.</p>	12	8



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100086	• May 12, 11	May 15, 11	Risk vs. Uncertainty at BP-Macondo This report recounts a conversation at OTC 2011 with a forensic engineer under contract with Anadarko about the BP-Macondo accident. The title of this report relates to an OTC panel in which a speaker the distinction between risk and uncertainty, as developed by economist Frank Knight in 1921.	4	0
010111	• Jan 01, 11		IXTOC-1 vs. Macondo This article by George Baker, written in Spanish, proposes several lessons for Mexico of the BP-Macondo well blowout, noting that few, if any lessons, were learned from the Ixtoc-1 blowout of 1979-80. In both case the blow-out preventer malfunctioned, and each, at its time, was the largest offshore oil spill on record. ENERGIA A DEBATE (VII), 42: 16 (Jan.-Feb. 2011) http://energiaadebate.com/ixtoc-1-vs-macondo/	1	2
112110	• Nov 21, 10		Ixtoc-1 vs. Macondo Las lecciones que aporta el caso del pozo descontrolado costa fuera de Luisiana son de igual relevancia para México que para Estados Unidos ¿Por qué? Porque los dos países—más Cuba—comparten las aguas del Golfo de México. Al parecer, el gobierno y la sociedad civil de México no lograron sacar lecciones relevantes del derrame de 1979-80 del pozo exploratorio Ixtoc-1 de Petróleos Mexicanos. Published in Energía a Debate (November 2010), and available online.	1	0
100048	• Jun 08, 10	Jun 20, 10	The Key Lesson from BP-Macondo: Changing the Culture of Silence What stands out most from the public record of the days and hours before the blow-out is the passivity of the rig crew, contractors and well owner. Everyone onboard the rig knew that there were serious problems; but no response rose above the level of griping and sarcastic barbs. The key problem, press reports suggest, is that each party took its point of view personally: there was no objective, independent assessment of the danger to which everyone was exposed. This culture of dangerous silence is what, fundamentally, needs to change. Here are two ideas for changing it.	2	1
100046	• May 28, 10		Rig Governance Model in Doubt Most the controversial decisions that were taken by BP on April 18, 19 and 20-some, it is reported, with the concurrence of the MMS-were done with the knowledge--and foreboding-- of senior managers from contractors, including Transocean, the rig owner. This report notes critical moments and decisions in the final phase before the well blow-out on April 20. (The <i>New York Times</i> report published on Dec. 26, 2010, is instructive, to be complemented by the several other studies that have been released.)	1	2



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100044	• May 22, 10		Macondo Blowout: Safety Violations or Negligence? <p>Among the many unfolding ramifications of the blowout at BP's Macondo Prospect in Block 252 of the Mississippi Canyon a new legal dispute could arise over the definitions of negligence and prior knowledge. This report examines ambiguities in conventional understandings of these two legal concepts. Much is at stake, as BP's partner Anadarko has refused to pay a proportional share of the Macondo losses, alleging "gross negligence," the meaning of which the courts of law and public opinion will have to decide.</p>	2	1
100043	• May 19, 10		Macondo Lessons for Mexico and Cuba <p>The lessons that should be derived from the yet-uncontrolled oil spill at BP's Macondo Prospect have importance for Mexico and Cuba as much as for the United States. All three countries share the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and all are affected by any damage to their shared marine environment. The report asks about the institutional and commercial safeguards needed to prevent the repetition of an accident of this scale.</p>	2	0
100041	• Apr 30, 10		Oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico, 1979 vs. 2010 <p>This report contrasts the public response in Mexico to the Ixtoc-I well blowout in 1979 to that of the American response to the blowout at BP's Macondo Prospect in 2010. It is noted that the U.S. public is largely indifferent to the nationality of the oil company that operates in the Gulf of Mexico. In the U.S. media BP was "an oil firm based in London" and Transocean was a "Swiss company." In Mexico, there is a sharp line drawn that separates Pemex from "foreign" oil and service companies.</p>	1	0